Counterinsurgency warfare: theory and practice / David Galula; Foreword by John A. David Galula drank as deeply of this bitter draught as did his contempo -. Counterinsurgency Warfare has ratings and 47 reviews. Roger said: Short, lucid, clear how-to manual on defeating insurgencies. Written in , but r. Booktopia has Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice by David Galula. Buy a discounted Paperback of Counterinsurgency Warfare online from.
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I can definitely see how the complacency of the general gslula can let a political movement that may not be to its direct benefit progress. Account Options Sign in. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 33, Iss 5, p. Tactics Having developed a strategic base for counterinsurgency, Galula turns his attention to tactics.
His strategy is divided into eight steps: Citing Beyond Intractability resources. Direct Action Against the Insurgent. If there is one thing to learn from the author it is that military might alone cannot defeat an insurgency and that ultimately it is the support of the population that will win the conflict. While some parts of the book are obviously dated, the core of the theory is still applicable today, and can be witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as several nations in Africa.
Those willing to actively support a counterinsurgency operation should be supported in their efforts to rally the relatively neutral majority and neutralize the hostile minority. While counterinsurgents are powerful, they are obliged to uphold law and order, which limits their potential action. The political movement of the masses must overwhelm the insurgencies political message.
That is, the support of the people is the primary objective of a counterinsurgency campaign.
In some ways, this aids a counterinsurgency because the “moral ttheory surrounding the insurgents dissipates and the counterinsurgency is free to act more decisively. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent’s comeback in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. New to the site? A free and open online seminar that takes a complexity-oriented approach to frontier-of-the-field issues related to intractable conflict.
Summary of “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice”
An insurgency can only succeed by building on the population’s real grievances. Establish contact with the population and control its movements in order to cut off its links advid the guerillas Destroy the local insurgent political organizations Set up, by means of elections, new thory local authorities.
Summary of “Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice” | Beyond Intractability
Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerillas. Trinquier tends to focus on the tactical cunterinsurgency operational level, and although he acknowledges the importance of politics in counterinsurgency, he tends to address military issues.
Aug 10, Michael rated it it was amazing. But decisive action does not necessarily mean military action. Indeed ,as Galula put it, “Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political ahd, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population. Vulnerability of the Insurgent in the Shortcut Pattern. Be the first to ask a question about Counterinsurgency Warfare.
But Galula also got a lot of other stuff right, and he deserves credit for his insights. Theory and Practics Westport, Connecticut: Links to quality news, opinion pieces, and reports that explain the intractable conflict problem and highlight successful responses.
The population must sympathize with counter insurgent’s cause and voluntarily provide information that will defeat the insurgency. A bit oversimplified, but still a foundational work on counterinsurgency warfaree for good reason. Developing an effective doctrine requires the knowledge of what the population really wants.
While a revolution is a sudden and “accidental” mass movement and a plot or coup is an intentional effort to overthrow the top leadership in a swift action, an insurgency is intentional, but not swift. It took a lot more effort than I was expecting but my biggest frustration is counterinxurgency this book was written in and our military is still learning the lessons in here the hard way.
Recently the same theories have been practicf by the US Department of Defense, tempered by our experiences in Afghanistan and post-war Iraq, and incorporated into Field Manualdqvid I first read Colonel Galula’s book many years ago, in preparation for my assignment in Vietnam. Replace the softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Much of what I have to say are merely reflections of an amateur observer. Sure, it’s from the insurgent point of view, but you’ll learn far more practicd than you will here, because coungerinsurgency the subtitle may be “Theory and Practice,” the truth of the matter is that there’s no real “practice” in this book.
A very interesting and only too relevant book on counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare. Drawn from the observations of a French officer, David Galula, who witnessed guerrilla warfare on three continents, the book remains relevant today as American policymakers, military analysts, and members of the public look to counterinsurgnecy counterinsurgency era of the s for lessons to apply to the current situation gwlula Iraq and Afghanistan.
Another interesting topic discussed was the relative ease that cohnterinsurgency can develop and surprise any population once they become fully active. While insurgencies often fail on their own accord, “Relying on luck Inspired by his military experiences as a French military officer and attache in China, Greece, Southeast Asia, and Algeria, the author realized the “need for a compass” in the suppression of The book is well written and informative, but military theory isolated from particular wars and situations comes across as generic and too lacking in detail.
Galula served as a French military officer in WWII asd afterwords in various outposts of unrest through the cold war, culminating in Algeria during the French army’s rebellion. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. Reading it, so much of what Galula talks about seems so obvious now, but that only stands as evidence of how seminal a book it is in the field.
Lessons learned should then be rapidly applied to subsequent areas. Counterinsurgency in the Cold Revolutionary War. Find bj what you can do to help society more constructively handle the intractable conflicts that are making so many problems insoluble.